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Abstract: The last two decades have seen the (re)emergence of the concept of recognition in ethical and 
political theory. Oftentimes, recognition is seen as a deeper, more developed version of tolerance, without 
the problems that tolerance purportedly has. We should not “merely” tolerate different individuals, 
identities and cultures, but recognize them, or so the argument goes. This move from tolerance to 
recognition is not without its critics. We will outline some of these criticisms and address them with 
the resources provided by the theory of recognition. We will suggest that while some of the criticisms 
are unfounded, the move from tolerance to recognition has a number of problems that the critics have 
correctly pointed out. The relationship between tolerance and recognition is complex: both have their 
own aims and functions. We will suggest that there are cases–especially ones that involve deep moral 
disagreements–where tolerance is a more reasonable aim than recognition.
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Traditionally, disagreements and frictions between various dissenting voices and cultural groups have been 
addressed by invoking the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is supposed give our political theories sufficient 
resources to deal with cultural and practical differences between various groups without violence or 
oppression. Despite the popular and academic interest in tolerance in its various forms, many authors have 
argued that for this task the notion of recognition is better suited than tolerance. Indeed, many insist that 
because tolerance involves a negative moral judgment, it is inherently insulting, oppressive or otherwise 
harmful. These authors suggest that we should replace tolerance with attitudes of recognition, as the latter 
do not necessarily entail negative judgments but, on the contrary, positive affirmation. So, we would be 
better off politically and ethically, if we sought to recognize various minorities rather than simply tolerating 
them.1 
The last two decades have seen the (re)emergence of the concept of recognition in ethical and political 
theory. Sparked by the work of Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth (both drawing from Hegel) and developed 
by others, this strand of political theory seeks to provide an overarching account of social justice and explain 
the way in which Western politics has changed after the Second World War. Roughly speaking, we have seen 
a shift from the politics of universal rights to the politics of specific identities or cultural minorities. The 
needs and claims of various cultural, racial and sexual minorities have taken the center stage. The theory of 
recognition is an attempt to formulate a political theory that takes into account this central development.2 
1 Various theories of tolerance and recognition are employed to engage issues in theology, religion, politics and ethics. These 
include, among others, interreligious dialogue, ecumenism, religious and ideological tolerance and so on. In this paper, we 
aim to provide an analysis of these theories in theoretical and conceptual context without addressing particular applications.  
2 For an overview of discussion, see Thompson, The Political Theory of Recognition. 
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Despite the widespread turn from tolerance to recognition, there are dissenting voices. Some critics 
insist that the concept of tolerance has its uses and it has certain benefits that accounts of recognition 
do not have. In addition, they reject the assumption that many recognition theorists make, namely, that 
recognitive attitudes are somehow deeper and more ethical than tolerance. 
In what follows, we will outline some concerns of those who defend tolerance against recognition, 
especially the British sociologist Frank Furedi, and seek to address these concerns with the resources 
drawn from recognition theories. We will suggest that many of Furedi’s concerns can be answered by 
having a sufficiently nuanced account of recognitive attitudes. However, we will also suggest that some 
of Furedi’s concerns will remain sound and point towards problems in accounts of recognition, or at least 
their popular, vernacular interpretations. These concerns have to do with how the formation of self-esteem 
and self-respect is understood and the possibility of recognition becoming oppressive. Also problematic 
are attempts to adopt recognitive attitudes in cases of significant moral disagreement. We conclude that 
recognition and tolerance are quite different attitudes, can express themselves in different kinds actions 
and can easily overlap with one another.    
Tolerance, Old and New
Let us begin with the general nature of tolerance. In political philosophy, tolerance emerged as a method 
to deal with the diversity of opinions, beliefs and practices in a country of many different religious groups.3 
The need for such an idea was especially dire after the 16th and 17th century disputes and wars of religion 
in the aftermath of the Reformation. The “old” version of tolerance (still widely used) draws heavily from 
the thought of John Locke and J. S. Mill. The “old” tolerance is explicit about the value of the person holding 
dissenting beliefs or practices. It assumes that all parties are moral subjects, rational actors who have 
arrived at their convictions via similar cognitive processes. In other words, the presumption is that most 
people are rational and capable of engaging in a reasonable exchange of opinions. It is further assumed 
that such open exchanges between diverse opinions benefit the society as a whole.4  
A number of contemporary accounts of tolerance still resonate with this historical reality. According 
to standard accounts, three basic conditions need to be met in order for tolerance to be possible.5 First, 
there must be an actual disagreement about beliefs or practices between two parties. If there is no such 
disagreement, there seems to be no reason for one party to tolerate the other. Second, there must be ways 
in which one party can, if they so choose, hinder or otherwise forbid the tolerated activity. Again, it seems 
strange to talk about tolerance, if the party that tolerates does not have the means to hinder or control the 
tolerated activity. Third, despite the possibility to hinder or control, this is not done; instead, the dissenting 
beliefs and practices are allowed. All these three aspects require rational and moral judgment: there should 
be reasons to disagree and reasons to allow the other’s practices and beliefs.   
But many are now critical of this kind of tolerance. The “new” tolerance, or tolerance-as -recognition, 
is more interested in identities than beliefs and practices. For example, Anna Galeotti argues that the 
meaning of tolerance needs to be revised so that “toleration will be conceived as a form of recognition of 
different identities in the public sphere”, which entails “a semantic extension from the negative meaning of 
non-interference to the positive sense of acceptance and recognition.”6 Several others, like Tariq Ramadan, 
Susan Mendus and Axel Honneth, have expressed more or less similar concerns.7 
“Old” tolerance is now perceived as a negative attitude that offers to its subjects “mere tolerance”, 
which necessarily entails negative judgments, that is, reasons for disagreement. Justice requires more 
3 Furedi offers this historical account in his On Toleration.
4 This was the view of J. S. Mill (On Liberty).
5 See, e.g., Horton, “Toleration”; Cohen, “What Toleration is”; Ricoeur, “The Erosion of Tolerance and the Resistance of the 
Intolerable”; Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance. Essays in Political Philosophy, 187.  
6 Galeotti, Tolerance as Recognition, 10. Quoted in Furedi, On Tolerance, 18.
7 Ramadan, The Quest for Meaning; Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism; Honneth, The Fragmented World. 
Quoted in Furedi, On Tolerance, 84–87.
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than a negative judgment accompanied by the tolerator’s acceptance of dissenting practices and beliefs. 
Subaltern groups deserve to have their beliefs and practices affirmed or at least not negatively judged. 
“Mere” tolerance keeps reminding the tolerated that there is something wrong about them and this is 
detrimental to their mental wellbeing. The “merely” tolerated are not, in this view, full members of the 
society, but more like second-class citizens.
These claims have their roots in political theories of recognition. There is no one single account of 
recognition, as the concept is used in a number of contexts in political and ethical theory. Instead 
of reviewing this complex literature, we focus on what we take as the best contemporary account of 
recognition: that of Axel Honneth and his followers and critics.8 Theories of recognition have their roots in 
Hegel’s philosophy. For Hegel, politics is not about securing Kantian universal rights but instead about the 
struggle of individuals and groups to have their specific identities recognized. This struggle drives societies 
towards equal rights and social justice: in  the idea society, all claims for recognition are recognized.9  
Charles Taylor’s seminal 1994 paper “The Politics of Recognition” is often seen as the starting point 
for debates about recognition in the English-speaking world.10 For Taylor, we have seen a shift from 
politics of universality to politics of identity. His argument is that multicultural societies actually turn out 
to be oppressive, if they only focus on prescribing legal norms for universal or equal treatment for all. 
The problem with universal or equal treatment is that individuals and groups all differ from one another: 
providing exactly the same treatment for all does not guarantee justice. In a multicultural society, it would 
be preferable, Taylor claims, to move the focus from universal principles of equal treatment to more 
particular laws and norms to make sure that specific identities and cultural traditions are treated justly. 
Axel Honneth’s account of recognition is the most comprehensive and nuanced account to date.11 
Like Taylor, Honneth draws extensively from Hegel, but, unlike Taylor, also from Jürgen Habermas and 
the tradition of Critical Theory. Honneth’s account of recognition aims to explain how the individual’s 
psychological development towards healthy self-respect and self-esteem requires recognition and how 
emotions of injustice and misrecognition drive social conflicts. Honneth’s account is rather nuanced 
compared to others, as it distinguishes between three types of recognitive attitudes: love, respect and 
esteem. 
Honneth’s central point is that love is a kind of recognition we all need in order to develop into fully 
functioning moral subjects with healthy self-esteem and self-respect. If we are not loved, the development 
of our personality is severely impaired. When people’s bodies are, for instance, physically abused or raped, 
they are deprived of love in the sense of respect. In addition, if a person is subjected to various other forms 
of non-physical violence, by, for instance, ignoring their basic need for sustenance and security as children, 
they are disrespected in this particular sense. According to this developmental view, then, adequate 
recognition precedes or accompanies the development of normal human cognition.  
The second component of recognition is what Honneth calls respect. To be respected is to have 
one’s basic rights as a citizen and as a moral subject acknowledged. Respect in this sense involves that 
an individual is taken to be “a full-fledged partner in interaction”, a human being with basic aspects of 
personhood, such as rationality and moral dignity. A person is not properly recognized, if she is treated 
as a substandard citizen or her claim to moral dignity and personhood is completely denied, like in the 
case of the person being forced into slavery. For Honneth, this aspect of recognition is mostly conferred to 
individuals by the state by having laws about basic, universal human rights. 
The third component of recognition is esteem. Esteem has to do with one’s achievements and social 
status. To have one’s basic rights and personhood respected is something that every human being has an 
equal claim for. In other words, we ought to give everyone recognition in the sense of respect. This does not 
apply to recognition as esteem, which depends on the particular individual. The object of esteem recognition 
is a specific achievement or position of the individual, not the individual’s personhood in general. One 
8 Laitinen & Ikäheimo, “Analyzing Recognition”; McBride, Recognition; Thompson, The Political Theory of Recognition.  
9 For Hegel’s theory of recognition, see Anderson, Hegel’s Theory of Recognition; Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition.
10 Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”. 
11 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition; The I in We.   
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can be esteemed, for instance, for one’s skills in ice hockey or knowledge of political theory. In addition, 
esteem recognition can be given to individuals because of their culture or identity. Misrecognition in terms 
of esteem would mean that one’s achievements, status, culture or identity is not properly recognized, for 
instance, when one is invalidly judged as lazy or one is being judged on the basis of a misguided racial or 
ethnic stereotype.  
For Honneth, all these three aspects, love, respect and esteem, are psychologically necessary, especially 
when we are children, to develop and sustain an autonomous, moral personhood with healthy self-esteem 
and self-respect. In a very basic sense, then, recognition is a basic psychological need that human beings 
have. From this premise, Honneth can then claim that misrecognition or lack of recognition is a serious 
psychological harm, thus making it prima facie immoral. When a person subsequently feels treated 
unjustly or being misrecognized, this will, according to Honneth, trigger a claim and a movement towards 
demanding recognition. This in turn requires others to take these claims to recognition seriously. It is this 
“struggle for recognition” that is, in Honneth’s view, the driving force of social and political justice. 
Philosophers Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen have usefully clarified and developed Honneth’s 
account.12 Their central claim is that recognition and its various aspects can be taken as kinds of attitudes 
that people have towards each other. Recognition is thus best described as an interpersonal attitude. In 
the most general sense, A recognizes B when A adopts a set of cognitive, conative and emotive attitudes 
towards B, where A takes B to be a person.13   
On the Ikäheimo and Laitinen analysis, recognition can be distinguished from two closely- related 
attitudes, identification and acknowledgement, by reference to their objects. For them, recognition is an 
interpersonal attitude whereas acknowledgement can be directed towards normative entities. We can, 
according to this analysis, acknowledge norms, principles, rules or claims as valid, reasons as good or bad 
and values as genuine. Acknowledgement is further distinguished from mere identification. Identification 
is a basic cognitive act of discernment whereby we sort the entities and objects we encounter into classes 
without further normative assessment.  
Ikäheimo and Laitinen make it clear that recognition is a dialogical attitude, namely, that A cannot 
successfully recognize B, if B does not acknowledge A as an appropriate recognizer. Furthermore, they 
emphasise that B must also understand the content of A’s recognitive attitudes and acknowledges A’s 
reasons as good reasons to recognize B. This does not mean that B has to in fact recognize A in the same 
sense that A recognizes B. It is enough that B is sufficiently interested in A’s recognition and thinks that A 
is a competent judge, to recognize B. This dialogical notion of recognition rules out the possibility purely 
unilateral recognition. 
Honneth’s theory of recognition has attracted some critical discussion as well. Some critics, not 
wholly unlike Furedi, reject recognition wholesale and seek other ways to account for social conflicts and 
struggles and formulate alternative political theories.14 Others claim that although Honneth’s account has 
some problems, the concept of recognition is nevertheless useful. One central debate was instigated by 
Nancy Fraser who argued that Honneth’s theory unjustifiably reduces all social struggles to struggles for 
recognition, while in fact a number of social struggles are not about recognition but about redistribution of 
goods in the society.15 
12 Ikäheimo & Laitinen, “Analysing Recognition”. 
13 Attitudes are understood very broadly in the Ikäheimo and Laitinen account. For instance, they reject the claim that 
recognitive attitudes are necessarily propositional or clearly linguistically expressible. Recognitive attitudes, like love, might 
very well be implicit or tacit. One critical response to reducing relationships of recognition to attitudes could be that recognition 
has to do with statuses that we attribute or give to one another. Ikäheimo and Laitinen respond by pointing out that statuses can 
be, in their view, reducible to attitudes that people take towards one another. If A has a specific status as, say, a police officer, 
this status can be analysed as a set of attitudes that others (and A herself) take towards A.  
14 Brian Barry, for instance, claims that because we are right to ignore cultural, ethnic, racial, sexual differences in liberal 
politics, all accounts of recognition begin from a false premise. See, Barry, Culture and Equality.  
15 See, Honneth and Fraser, Redistribution or Recognition? 
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What Is Wrong with “New” Tolerance?
Furedi admits that sometimes recognition is indeed the correct attitude: for example, when we speak 
about the “mere” toleration of racial minorities.16 But this is not always the case. We must, he contends, 
distinguish carefully beliefs, practices and people. Old tolerance is directed towards individual practices 
and beliefs and it assumes that individuals are moral and rational agents. The “new” tolerance, however, 
claims that it is not enough to think of individuals as moral and rational agents: if we are to respect them 
properly, we need to acknowledge or affirm their beliefs, practices and identities as well.
Furedi provides a number of reasons why replacing tolerance with recognition or extending our account 
of tolerance in the way outlined above is a problematic idea and why even if it aims towards something 
beneficial, it will likely cause more harm than good. We want to highlight four issues.17 
First, Furedi is concerned that by replacing tolerance with recognition we might end up overriding 
moral and rational judgment by forcing value judgments upon people. Automatic granting of esteem makes 
the whole concept of recognition vacuous and void of meaning. If recognition is simply demanded for cases 
where people are in disagreement, this makes discussion about contested issues impossible. The problem 
here is that esteem, on Furedi’s account, cannot be demanded or required, since value judgments and 
responses to moral duties are not directly under the volitional control of individuals. There is no valuation 
without moral and rational judgment and with judgment there is always the possibility of a negative 
outcome. Things get worse, if esteem is forced legally: if A is prescribed by law to esteem B, this prescription 
is basically trying to force A to make moral judgments and valuations about B without adequate reasons 
that A could find compelling.
Secondly, Furedi is worried that truth will become the victim of recognition. Replacing tolerance with 
recognition contributes to our “culture of victimhood”: not only does it make public discourse increasingly 
difficult, but it also promotes a way settling disputes that is antithetical to intellectual virtues.18 Granted, 
sometimes it is wise and tactful to pay attention to one’s peer’s emotions but putting emotional issues 
before truth as a general belief policy is vicious, both in epistemic and moral sense. The claim is that if we 
think of social life only in terms of recognition, we might become unable to form and express our moral, 
aesthetic and other value judgments. If this happens, we would be left without tools to assess competing 
claims for recognition. 
Thirdly, replacing tolerance with recognition assumes a view of moral agency that is inherently 
passive. According to Furedi’s critique, theories of recognition tend to assume that individuals are passive 
receptacles of institutionally mediated recognition or recognition from other people. Without these forms 
of recognition, the individual will not be able to form and sustain any kind of moral judgments, cultural 
identity or self-esteem. Not only are individuals passive recipients of recognition coming from outside 
themselves from institutions, they are also deeply biased and as such are unlikely to be swayed by public 
discourse and reasoned arguments. The claim that people are deeply dependent on outside recognition 
could be used, Furedi suggests, to justify morally-problematic actions, such as legally or institutionally 
imposing some valuations and beliefs or banning or outlawing some voices in the public debate. 
Fourthly, although “new” tolerance adopts the moral high ground and represents itself as being 
sensitive to the concerns of subaltern groups, it might actually be a thinly-veiled abuse of power. Furedi 
suggests that recognition could be used to silence dissenters with inconvenient messages in an ad hoc 
manner. The fundamental irony of this is that in pluralist state everyone can claim the status of victim: 
“Rather than arguments being an exchange and competition of views, many discussions now consist 
largely of the two sides trying to get each other censored.”19
16 Furedi, On Tolerance, 12.
17 These concerns appear throughout On Toleration. 
18 See, e.g., Campbell and Manning, “Microaggressions and Moral Cultures”.
19 Furedi, On Toleration, 159.
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In Defence of “New” Tolerance
The first of Furedi’s concerns is that recognition can easily become problematic, if it indeed involves an 
institutional demand to esteem different cultures, identities or minorities. In fact, both Honneth’s and 
Taylor’s accounts of esteem recognition explicitly state that esteem cannot be demanded or forced for the 
very reason that value judgments cannot be forced or regulated from the outside. Honneth writes about this 
in the context of cultural identities and values:
The sort of social esteem that would be entailed in recognizing a culture as something valuable is not a public res-
ponse that could be appealed for or demanded, since it could only arise spontaneously or voluntarily according to 
standards of evaluative examination. In contrast to the esteem normatively required by institutionalized merit prin-
ciple, there is no possibility of normatively demanding the positive evaluation of cultural ways of life. At best we can 
here speak only of the readiness to take note of the specific qualities of other cultures such that their value can be 
reexamined.20 
Cillian McBride continues by emphasizing that positive esteem recognition cannot be given without actually 
evaluating the candidate.21 In order for A to esteem B’s cultural identity, A must make positive normative 
judgments about B’s culture. But with normatively assessing B’s culture, the possibility of negative judgment 
also necessarily emerges. For the judgment to be genuine and the esteem to be true, it seems that positive 
recognition cannot be forced or directly prescribed from the outside, not even by the minority culture that 
seeks recognition. However, there is something that can be prescribed or demanded: that all cultures and 
identities have an equal chance to be considered and evaluated; in other words, they have equal respect 
such that they should be considered as viable candidates for esteem.  
Given this, it seems to us that Furedi’s first concern is unfounded, at least as it applies to the theory 
recognition, not its vernacular use.22 At the theoretical level, accounts of recognition indeed acknowledge 
that esteem cannot be demanded at will or prescribed directly by law. In this sense, moving from tolerance 
to recognition does not necessarily entail oppression or stifling of public debate. 
As far as we see it, Furedi’s second concern is that recognition might end up neglecting moral judgment 
and public debate altogether. Again, a closer look at theories of recognition reveals Furedi’s concerns mostly 
unfounded. Although some critics of Honneth have put forward similar criticisms, theories of recognition 
indeed leave plenty of room for normative assessment of competing claims to recognition. 
In order to make this point, let us look at what Ikäheimo and Laitinen say about misrecognition and 
assessing different claims for recognition.23 According to them, moral judgments are necessary in order to 
discern what struggles for recognition are legitimate struggles. All claims for recognition do indeed require 
justification. If members of a certain group feel that they are misrecognized or that they do not get the 
esteem they think they deserve, it does not necessarily follow that others have a duty to offer this missing 
recognition to them. Not all claims and struggles for recognition are valid. 
In order to judge and assess competing claims for recognition, we must, Ikäheimo and Laitinen claim, 
assume that there are some truths about B’s personhood that are in principle independent of whether 
A or B know them. In other words, we must assume some minimally-objective truths about persons and 
20 Quoted in McBride, Recognition, 50. 
21 McBride, Recognition, 33-34. 
22 In his work, Furedi does not distinguish between theoretical and vernacular uses. From the viewpoint of sociology, this is 
understandable as theories are only as good as their practical applications. Furedi uses UNESCO’s Declaration of Principles of 
Tolerance  (1:1) as an example of how confused the language of tolerance has become: “Tolerance is respect, acceptance and 
appreciation of the rich diversity of our world’s cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by 
knowledge, openness, communication and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is 
not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement.” Furedi (On Toleration, 8-9) interprets UNESCO’s principles 
so that they manifest a sensibility of automatic acceptation and unconditional appreciation of different cultures. In effect, this 
reduces tolerance to “psychological attitude that conveys acceptance, empathy and respect” at the cost of demand for public 
critical deliberation and evaluation of these cultures.
23 Ikäheimo and Laitinen, “Analysing Recognition”, 51-56. 
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their value. The objective feature of these truths need not be fleshed out in terms of some metaphysically 
necessary Platonic ideas or something of that kind. They write: 
 As we see it, talking about an ‘objective point of view’ does not as such imply anything else than the minimal sense of 
objectivism, which we usually take for granted in our moral and political life. We are constantly engaged in struggles for 
recognition, as well as disputes over recognition and misrecognition, in which we presuppose de facto that there is some 
(however contested and difficult to find out) fact of the matter as to whether something really is a case of adequate or 
appropriate recognition or rather one of misrecognition. If, or when, we do not make this presumption, we are in danger of 
collapsing the distinction between struggles for recognition and strategic struggles.24
We cannot simply take for granted that all demands for recognition in the political and social arena are 
equally valid. Feelings of misrecognition and unjust treatment may be signs of actual misrecognition or 
injustice but are not by themselves authoritative. In order to assess the validity of competing claims for 
recognition, we must take people’s experiences and emotions seriously. We must give them the benefit of 
the doubt and respect them as equal moral subjects. However, this does not mean that their experiences 
and viewpoints alone decide whether we are dealing with an actual case of misrecognition or that there 
is an actual recognition deficit. Feelings and expectations of recognition are subject to all sorts of biases, 
distortions and indoctrinations as all our beliefs.25
Some constructive critics of Honneth explicitly say that we might have a moral obligation to disregard 
some claims for recognition. McBride maintains that some quests for recognition might indeed be left 
unsatisfied and justice could still be done. This might be because of the simple fact that in multicultural 
societies there could be mutually exclusive struggles for recognition.26 McBride also sees the possibility of 
cases where there is indeed a lack of recognition or misrecognition but that lack or misrecognition is morally 
justified. The reason why McBride thinks that Honneth sometimes does not acknowledge this fact properly 
is his assumption of “recognition deficit”. McBride argues that since most accounts of recognition focus on 
cases of misrecognition or lack of recognition where the negative psychological effects of misrecognition 
are severe, they end up implying that we always have a duty to prevent such effects and thus try to fulfil 
all claims for recognition.27 When we look at cases more generally and are not misled by the assumption 
that “recognition deficits” need to be automatically fulfilled, we see that “we can legitimately express our 
disesteem of others, with the result that their self-esteem is damaged. Indeed, we may often find that we 
are required to do so”28. So, McBride sums up, we need carefully distinguish moral judgments, justice and 
struggles for recognition. 
If the above is correct and recognition indeed allows for negative moral judgments, we must conclude 
that Furedi’s basic worry is unfounded: recognition does not necessarily lead to a situation in which we must 
abstain from morally assessing claims for recognition. This, however, pertains to theory of recognition, not 
in many vernacular ways the theory is being used.
Unresolved Issues in Theories of Recognition  
Furedi’s third concern has to do with claims about moral agency that theories of recognition make. We will 
suggest that Furedi’s concern here is at least partly warranted: although Honneth himself does not think 
that persons are simply passive recipients of recognition, his theory (like Taylor’s) could be more clear at 
this point and they are often interpreted in simplified terms. 
24 Ikäheimo and Laitinen, “Analysing Recognition”, 55-56.
25 Ikäheimo and Laitinen, “Analysing Recognition”, 56. Sadly, we are rather unreliable narrators of our stories. See, 
Kristjansson, Virtues and Vices in Positive Psychology, 57.
26 McBride, Recognition, 34-35. 
27 Furedi (On Toleration, 111) calls this “therapeutic censorship”. 
28 McBride, Recognition, 104. 
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According to McBride, 
Honneth argues that social recognition, in the form of respect and esteem, is necessary if we are to develop self-respect and 
self-esteem. It would seem to follow, then, that the experience of slavery and other forms of social death should automati-
cally undermine one’s self-respect: that one’s self-respect, one’s dignity can be destroyed by others.29
 Honneth seems to assume that the sufficient psychological states needed to develop and uphold self-
esteem, self-respect and a coherent self-identity are constantly dependent upon recognition coming from 
outside the individual. If this were taken to the extreme, all misrecognitions would be extremely harmful 
indeed, because they would threaten the psychological integrity of the self quite severely. This way of 
looking at misrecognition is in line with the “recognition deficit” assumption mentioned above. If it indeed 
were the case that all cases of misrecognition or lack of recognition pose a serious threat to individual’s self-
esteem and identity, it would seem plausible that we would have at least a prima facie duty to offer valid or 
sufficient recognition. 
Against this, McBride wants to suggest that the “recognition-deficit” model makes a number of 
implausible psychological assumptions. He goes on to give a number of historical examples where 
individuals have managed to maintain their self-respect in the face of external deprivation of respect and 
esteem.30 He mentions Primo Levi’s experiences in German death camps and the struggles of slaves.31 The 
conclusion he draws from these cases is this: although various forms of recognition can be beneficial and 
important for the growth of self-esteem, self-understanding and self-respect, they are not always necessary. 
In other words, in many cases of complete misrecognition or lack of outside recognition, people can still 
maintain the required level of self-respect and self-esteem for moral autonomy and personhood. This is 
because basic respect does not completely depend on external conditions. He writes:
I can retain my self-respect in the face of public assaults upon my dignity because my self-respect does not depend on 
other’s reactions to me, but on my ability to recognize myself in the light of moral standards which I bring to bear upon 
my own conduct.32
In this view, self-respect is based on a kind of “self-judgment”: I have moral standards against which I 
judge myself. I can be pressured by external circumstances and other people to go against my own moral 
standards by making it almost impossible for me to follow them. Further, the specific moral standards I have 
are of course to some extent dependent on other people: we get our moral codes from others. Nevertheless, 
McBride maintains that, ultimately, my self-respect is up to me; it is my judgment of my own moral worth 
that counts the most, not the external circumstances. 
We are sympathetic towards McBride’s view and agree that beginning from the assumption of 
“recognition-deficit” lacks proper nuance. However, it is not clear that Taylor and Honneth actually lack 
such nuance. Here we should distinguish carefully between different aspects of recognition and their 
contribution to the individual’s wellbeing. For Honneth, recognition as love is the most fundamental: not 
being loved and nurtured as child will permanently damage the individual. But if a person has had the 
opportunity to enjoy love as a child, the person will be more resistant to misrecognitions, disrespect and 
disesteem later in life. Such a person can indeed uphold her self-esteem even when she is not constantly 
recognized by others, or even in circumstances that are severely detrimental to one’s esteem. Thus, we 
suggest that McBride’s views might not be so different from Honneth’s as it might first seem. Nevertheless, 
we should bear in mind McBride’s main point: we should not begin from the assumption that our self-respect 
29 Ibid., 64.
30 Ibid., 64-66. 
31 The Jewish psychiatrist, Auschwitz inmate and subsequent creator of logotherapy, Viktor Frankl also addresses similar 
issues. According to Frankl, in the grueling conditions of the concentration camp, individuals who lost their self-respect and 
purpose in life perished quickly regardless of their physical fitness. However, Frankl maintains that self-respect and meaningful 
life are choices that are up to the individual to make no matter how bad the circumstances are. See, Frankl, Man’s Search for 
Meaning.  
32 McBride, Recognition, 66.
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and self-esteem always depends on others. Such an assumption would indeed lead into too simplified and 
one-sided accounts of moral agency. We might end up becoming, as Furedi suggests, overly sensitive and 
protective of people’s feelings of self-respect.  
Finally, we will address Furedi’s fourth concern that has to do with recognition and abuses of power. 
Defenders of recognition claim that while tolerance can easily become (or simply is) oppressive, recognition 
does not have this problem. In other words, the move from tolerance to recognition will significantly lower 
the risk of unequal or otherwise problematic power relationships. Here we find ourselves mostly agreeing 
with Furedi’s concern: as many critics of Honneth have pointed out, attitudes of recognition can be hijacked 
by those in power to defend their agenda. Obviously, many critics of tolerance discuss cases where tolerance 
has been used in unjust and oppressive ways, but if Furedi and others are correct, as we suggest, recognitive 
attitudes are no better off than tolerance: recognition can become a thinly-veiled abuse of power as easily 
as tolerance. 
Let us first look at the argument that tolerance is oppressive. Rainer Forst distinguishes two kinds of 
tolerance: permission tolerance and respect tolerance.33 On the permission account of tolerance, tolerance 
is a state between a majority and a minority. The majority will permit the minority to have their beliefs and 
practices but only inside legal and moral limits prescribed by the majority. Forst uses the example of the 
Calvinist Hugenots living in Catholic France after the Edict of Nantes in 1598. The general rule was that the 
king, in this case, a Roman Catholic, would determine the religion of the nation. To this rule an exception 
was made: the Protestant minority was permitted to exist and their safety protected by law, but they were 
condemned to live in their own enclaves. So, according to Forst, permission tolerance is “a relation between 
authority and a dissenting, ‘different’ minority (or various minorities). Toleration means that authority 
gives qualified permission to the members of the minority to live according to their beliefs on the condition 
that the minority accepts the dominant position of the authority.”34
This kind of “official” tolerance, Forst argues, is indeed “insulting” and can easily be unjust (and, it 
must be noted in this case, is maintained at the whim of those in power, as seen in the revocation of the 
aforementioned ‘tolerance’ by the Edict of Fontainebleau in 1685 by Louis XIV).35 For one, it is the majority 
and their authority that gets to define the limits of the minority’s beliefs and practices and thereby doing 
effectively making the minority second-class citizens. So it is the majority (be that the king or the democratic 
authority) that determines what the disagreements are, what kinds of reasons there may be to accept and 
legitimize the disagreements and what kinds of beliefs and practices are out of bounds.  
Forst’s idea of respect tolerance comes closer to recognition. On the respect account, all citizens 
of a democratic community respect each other as legal and political equals, but nevertheless can have 
reasonable disagreements about the value of various practices and beliefs. In this view, tolerance requires 
that the disagreeing parties acknowledge or respect each other as equal moral and rational subjects while 
disagreeing on some particular issues. Forst is suggesting that respect tolerance is possible only when we 
commit ourselves to some universal moral norms and principles about the equal treatment of persons. 
Opposed to permission tolerance, in respect tolerance the various reasons involved in the acceptance 
component of tolerance are based on some general or universal moral framework that both parties share 
(at least to some extent). In other words, two parties can disagree about something by invoking their 
idiosyncratic reasons but they must justify their acceptance (or rejection) on some grounds that both sides 
more or less accept.  
We see no reason why recognitive attitudes could not be unjust and oppressive in exactly the same way 
as permission tolerance. In other words, the problem of unequal power relationships that beset permission 
tolerance also applies to recognition. McBride agrees and argues that
The traditional ‘permission’ model of toleration gave rise to concerns about the power relations between the tolerator 
and the tolerated, but it is clear that this underlying issue about inequalities of power will not be dispelled by moving 
from toleration to some notion of particular recognition, for the same relationships are in evidence here too. The more 
33 Forst, “To Tolerate Means to Insult”. 
34 Ibid., 219. 
35 http://www.museeprotestant.org/en/notice/the-edict-of-fontainebleau-or-the-revocation-1685/. Accessed 30 May 2016.
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powerful will assume the authority to extend recognition to the other, to welcome them into the circle, but this same 
gesture only serves to reaffirm the unequal position of the two parties. If anything, the recognitive version of this relati-
onship is more problematic because the weaker party in toleration relationship is only demanding freedom from inter-
ference, whereas the recognition model assumes rather that the weak desire the affirmation of the strong, without 
considering whether this desire might be not already be a product of their unequal relations and a means to confirm 
subordination.36   
Even when we think in terms of recognitive attitudes, the danger is that the recognizer “hijacks” the reasons 
and terms under which the other party is recognized (as in permission tolerance). As a result, the identity of 
the recognized party becomes too tightly scripted. For example, Keenan Malik points out how multicultural 
policies in Birmingham in 1980s ultimately failed because “...the city council’s plan effectively assigned 
every member of a minority to a discrete community, defined each group’s needs as a whole, and set the 
various organizations in competition with one another for city resources. And anyone who fell outside 
these defined communities was effectively excluded from the multicultural process altogether.”37 What is 
the point of treating people first and foremost as a member of distinct race, if within one race you have 
individuals from a number of mutually exclusive political parties and religious outlooks? For example, an 
Iraqi muslim living in Finland can have more politically in common with his Lutheran Finnish colleagues 
than with his “own” in the Muslim community.
Furthermore, there seems to be no guarantee that the same power relations that make some forms 
of tolerance unjust will not make some forms of recognition similarly unjust by simply maintaining the 
unequal status quo. McBride puts this worry elegantly by saying that the desire to be recognized is seductive 
and this seduction can lure us into complicity with our own oppressors. We can, for instance, be mistaken 
about our need to be recognized by some majority that imposes false conditions on our relationship.38 
Seeking recognition from this majority would then be much worse than simply demanding to be tolerated, 
because it would involve recognizing the majority as a competent recognizer and a legitimate source of 
recognition thereby supporting the underlying misrecognition. This insistence on mutuality highlights the 
difference between tolerance and recognition. Because tolerance can express itself simply as an inaction 
and disregard towards the tolerated, it might have some moral and political benefits over recognition, 
which always entails some kind of mutual, positive action between the two parties. We will take up to topic 
in more detail in the final section of the article.   
Why Recognition Cannot Replace Tolerance
Let us summarize what we have argued above. After examining Furedi’s first and second concern, we 
found them mostly unjustified insofar as they are directed towards the theory of recognition. In principle, 
the theory of recognition does not necessarily rule out moral debate, impose moral judgments on people 
against their will or end up contributing into “culture of victimhood”. We also concluded that Furedi’s 
third concern is partly unjustified but might have some truth to it. At least we should not emphasize the 
moral heteronomy of the individual too much. The fourth issue that Furedi flags, namely the issue of 
unequal power relationships, we find as problematic as Furedi. Where does this leave us with tolerance and 
recognition? In what follows, we highlight the differences between tolerance and recognition and suggest 
some reason why one cannot simply replace the other.  
36 McBride, Recognition, 39–40. 
37 Malik, “The Failure of Multiculturalism”. For example, think of instances in which members of an identifiable social 
minorities oppose ‘Affirmative Action’ initiatives presented as corrective, or, a progressive leftist woman who opposes abortion, 
a homosexual who opposes the same-sex marriage, a pacifist veteran, an atheist who thinks that religions are the force for good 
in the world, a working class person who votes for austerity measures, and so on. 
38 Slavoj Žižek has made similar claims that achieving a position where one can confer recognition or display one’s capacity for 
tolerance is a moral commodity, a way to gather social capital and esteem. Tolerance can, thus, be used to promote the status 
of the tolerator and simultaneously treat the tolerated in ways that harms her identity. More precisely, the tolerated are used as 
means to gain a certain kind of public glow. See, Pound, Žižek, 96-97, 134-137.
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There are clear discontinuities between tolerance and recognition. First, the object of recognition is 
different from the object of tolerance. In the standard account of tolerance, what is being tolerated is a 
practice, belief or a conviction. It is meant to say nothing about the value of the individuals engaged in these 
practices and beliefs. Indeed, the assumption built into ”old” tolerance is that all individuals are morally 
and rationally autonomous subjects. To put the point in the language of recognition, tolerance entails an 
aspect of basic respect. Recognition is a much more complex attitude in terms of its objects. Love is directed 
towards the person as a whole regardless of the person’s capacities or characteristics. Respect takes the 
person as a morally and rationally autonomous agent. Esteem is directed towards the person’s social status, 
achievements and specific features like culture and identity.  
Given the panoply of possible different objects, we ought to pay more attention to what we tolerate and 
the objects of our recognitive attitudes. Oftentimes race, political or religious beliefs, ideological practices, 
sexual orientations, cultures and identities are treated alike without good reasons. One’s racial background 
is involuntary and is quite different from one’s political convictions. Cultural practices (which are every now 
and then debated in public) such as cockfighting, peyote smoking and circumcision are clearly different 
from the two previous issues.39 The suggestion that we might have one abstract principle to deal with all 
these different issues seem rather far fetched in our view. In addition, it is crucial to draw a distinction 
between the person and person’s thoughts, words, and actions.40 While the former more easily falls under 
the concept of respect, tolerance (or esteem) is more suitable in the latter case.
The second difference between recognition and tolerance is that recognitive attitudes require a certain 
level of mutuality, whereas tolerance does not. A adequately recognizes B only if B acknowledges that A is 
a competent recognizer in the relevant respect and understands the content of A’s attitudes of recognition. 
None of this is needed for tolerance, as A can tolerate some of B’s practices or beliefs even if B does not 
acknowledge A at all.
The third difference is connected to the second one. Tolerance and recognition are quite different in 
terms of the kinds of actions they might entail.41 As tolerance partly consists of refraining from harmful 
or negative actions towards the tolerated, tolerance can often be expressed by not taking action. In other 
words, the attitude of tolerance can easily express itself as a simple inaction. Recognition does not work 
in the same way, because it always involves some act of granting or giving love, respect or esteem. The 
recognizer and the recognized both act on the basis of their recognitive attitudes: the recognizer offers 
esteem, love and respect and the recognized acknowledges the recognizer. This difference between the 
kinds of actions involved in recognition and tolerance also play out in misrecognition and intolerance. 
Forms of misrecognition and lack of recognition can be seen as forms of inaction: they do not take the other 
person into account in the proper way. Tolerance is compatible with disregard, whereas proper recognition 
is not. Unlike recognition, intolerance always expresses itself in the form of some action whereby one seeks, 
in way or another, to control the beliefs or practices the other person.42 
39 On tolerating cockfighting, see Bowlin, “Nature, Grace, and Toleration”. 
40 We realize that this distinction is far more complicated issue than what could be treated in the limits of this article. So far the 
best theoretical treatment, in our view, is Smith, What is a person?
41 We would like to thank our anonymous referee for making this point very clearly.
42 There could perhaps be a another difference that has to do with the kinds of emotions that are compatible with tolerance 
and recognition. On a superficial take, it might seem that tolerance is compatible with all sorts of negative emotions, like 
hate, dislike and disgust, whereas proper recognitive attitudes are incompatible with A strongly hating or disliking B. Things, 
however, might be not as simple as this. First of all, we have to distinguish between the different aspect of recognition. It seems 
plausible that love is not compatible with actively hating or despising the individual in question. It might, however, be possible 
to dislike some practices or tendencies of an individual and love them at the same time. Respect might also be compatible with 
having a host of negative attitudes towards the recognized individual. Furthermore, on Honneth’s account, respect is mainly 
provided by laws and other lawlike norms. So insofar as I respect another person’s rights as a moral and legal subject, I can 
hate or dislike that person as much as I want. Indeed, it would seem that strong negative moral emotions actually presuppose 
that the object of those emotions is a moral subject. Thus, hate, for instance, could be seen as only an interpersonal emotion. 
Finally, some forms of esteem also seem to be compatible with strong negative emotions. It seems plausible that I should be 
able to provide proper esteem to a smart and hard working colleague even if I strongly dislike or hate her because of her other 
features, such as her narcissistic character.
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Given these differences between the kinds of actions they can entail, it is easy to see why tolerance 
and recognition are not on a spectrum so that recognition is simpliciter something better than tolerance. 
One can esteem, say, the particular identity of some ethnic or minority group while at the same time being 
intolerant towards some of their practices. Imagine that there is a group of people holding that only men 
are allowed to have university education. We could, we contend, respect and hold in esteem the individuals 
in this group and their identity, while maintaining that this particular way to treat women is morally 
wrong. We could, if we wanted to, pressure or otherwise hinder such practices but we do not. In this sense, 
recognition and tolerance are clearly two different attitudes and can result in different kinds of compatible 
and incompatible actions.    
Finally, following Furedi and McBride, we suggest that serious problems will arise if we play fast-
and-loose with the claims for recognition. In many cases–especially ones that involve deep moral 
disagreements–a state of mutual esteem is almost impossible to achieve. In such cases, tolerance is a more 
preferable attitude; sometimes intolerance is the most moral option. Esteem is a reasonable goal only when 
there are shared networks of normative assesment, that is to say, when the opposite parties are already 
rather close to one another in terms of basic moral norms and precepts. Such conditions hold, for example, 
between various Christian churches and some political parties.
However, mutual esteem might turn out to be too ambitious a goal in cases where the two sides disagree 
about the moral nature of the centerpiece of the disagreement. This is especially the case when the practice 
or activity disagreed upon is part of the individual’s identity. Consider the practice of circumcision in 
Judaism, for example. For the critics, this practice is unhealthy and violates the basic rights of the infant, 
so it should be outlawed. It entails a lack recognition in all three senses: love, respect and esteem. For the 
practitioners, it is not a moral issue at all. Instead, it is about belonging to a particular group. It is exactly via 
circumcision that one becomes a recognized member of the group. Here the issue is rather complicated: if 
circumcision as a practice is not tolerated, it seems to the practitioners that they are denied proper esteem. 
Practicing circumcision is so part of Jewish identity that taking an attitude of esteem towards them would 
necessarily involve seeing circumcision as a morally neutral or positive practice. There seems to be no 
way to reach mutual recognition between parties without  first dissolving the moral disagreement. In such 
cases, esteem is not a reasonable goal and we should aim for tolerance instead.43  
This point applies more generally to religious practices and religious identities. Contemporary 
accounts of the evolution and psychology of religion suggest that religious thinking and behavior have a 
central role in building mutual trust and enhancing cooperation in human groups. Religion, it seems, has 
a special power to bring people together and give humans a sense of belonging. Indeed, this might have 
been the most central evolutionary function of religion.44 As a consequence, religious identities are often 
experienced very strongly and deeply. Religion achieves this strong sense of identity by propagating shared 
beliefs that bear significations relative to different domains of practical life (morality, public behavior, etc.) 
and by having people perform rituals and acting in certain ways. Sharing rituals, moral norms and other 
practices become central to a person’s identity. Thus, religious practices and identities become somewhat 
special: practices such as circumcision are so central to a person’s identity that negative moral judgement 
of them almost inevitably is interpreted as disrespect. This explains how religious practices become objects 
of public moral debate more easily than some other practices. All this emphasizes the point we made above: 
in cases of moral disagreement about practices central to religious identities, esteem recognition might be 
too demanding of a goal.  
We also want to point out, following Forst, that “old” tolerance implicitly contains many aspects of 
“new” tolerance.45 “Old” tolerance, for instance, begins from the basic assumption that individuals are 
morally and rationally autonomous. So both recognition and tolerance assume at least a minimal shared 
43 Edward Langerak has discussed the conditions and ethics of moral disagreements in a civil society in his Civil Disagreement: 
Personal Integrity in a Pluralist Society. 
44 Ara Norenzayan offers an accessible and comprehensive look into these theories in his Big Gods: How Religion Transformed 
Cooperation and Conflict. 
45 See also Vainio, “Virtue of Tolerance”.
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moral, normative framework. Public debates about tolerance are usually about the kinds of reasons that 
constitute morally permissible disagreement and variance; in other words, we debate and discuss the 
general moral standards according to which we accept or reject some practices and beliefs. This is only 
possible if it is undergirded by a shared moral conviction that we are all moral and rational individuals that 
have a claim for equal respect.   
The benefits of the theory of recognition are best seen in cases such as race, but as soon as we step 
outside this issue, we need to start using our moral judgment, that is, asking and giving reasons–and take 
the risk of being judged negatively. Nevertheless, the theory of recognition can provide us a way to better 
understand disagreements in cultures and countries where there are mutually incompatible practices and 
beliefs. Recognition does not give us solutions to our disagreements or offer substantial, practical scenarios 
that we can easily put into practise. Instead, it could help us to better conceptualize our disagreements and 
to identify the factors that contribute to such disagreements.  
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